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Our familiar practice of promising becomes puzzling once we try to philosophically make
sense of it: What exactly happens when the promisor promises the promisee to do X? And
how are we to understand the moral duty to keep one's promises? In his well-argued and
highly recommendable book, Anwander sheds light on both questions by developing his
“respect account of promises” (Achtungstheorie), which consists of four claims:
(1) Promises are joint commitments of promisee and promisor about what the promisor is
obligated to do.
(2) A promise creates a non-moral promissory obligation for the promisor to perform the
required action.
(3) The moral duty to keep promises is the duty to make one's non-performance of the
required action dependent upon the promisee's consent.
(4) The moral principle underlying this duty is the principle of respecting other persons'
(legislative) autonomy.
The first part of the book deals with the very idea of a promise and explains its
normativity. On Anwander's account, a promise is a twofold exercise of normative powers:
The promisor A communicates to the promisee B the intention of empowering B to obligate
her with regard to some action X, thereby conferring upon B the authority to commit her to X
(“offer”); and B exercises this authority by communicating to A the intention of actually
obligating Awith regard to X (“uptake”). As it always takes two to make one, a promise is a
joint binding of the promisor's will (claim 1). This interplay of offer and uptake distinguishes
promises from similar acts like threats, vows, announcements or predictions.
If — as claim 1 holds – promises result from joint acts of the will, and if — as common
sense holds — there is an analytic connection between “promise” and “obligation”, then
obligations will depend on (albeit joint) acts of the will. But as Hume famously argued, its
metaphysical pitfalls seem to make this idea untenable. Beginning with a helpful
reconstruction of Hume's worry and relying on Broome's work, Anwander tackles the
problem by distinguishing two varieties of obligations — moral duties versus normative
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requirements — and by arguing that Hume's objection only applies to the former, while the
obligation which is conceptually tied to promises is of the latter kind: It is analytically true
that if A promises B to do X, then A is normatively required to do X; but neither does the
promise create a moral reason to do X nor does it depend on any such reason. So what
follows from the concept of a promise is a non-moral promissory obligation on the part of A,
the content of which is A's performance of X (claim 2). But the moral duty to keep promises
has to be strictly separated from this non-moral promissory obligation (this is Anwander's
“separation thesis”); so Hume's challenge cannot find a grip and Anwander can keep up both,
the common sense view and claim 1.
The separation thesis implies that whether we have a moral duty to keep promises is a
substantial normative question, not a conceptual one. The second part of the book addresses
this question: Anwander fairly discusses the three prevailing attempts to account for the
moral duty to keep promises; he argues that neither voluntarist theories nor conventionalist
(or practice) accounts nor perlocutionary theories explain why we ought to keep promises.
His own answer to this question suggests that keeping one's promise is essentially a matter
of respecting the (legislative) autonomy of the promisee: We generally ought to respect
other persons' autonomy, i.e. their authority to decide for themselves. But, as shown in the
first part, with her promise to do X, the promisor A transferred upon B the authority to
commit her (i.e. A) to do X. In taking this offer up, B obtained the legislative authority to
decide for the promisor what she (i.e. A) has to do. So the general duty to respect others'
legislative authority requires of the promisor to respect the promisee's decision about what
she, the promisor, has to do. This is precisely what the promisor fails to do when she breaks
her promise: she defies the promisee's legislative authority. Hence, Anwander derives the
duty to keep promises from the general principle of respecting others' autonomy (claim 4):
We ought to keep promises because we ought to respect other persons and keeping a
promise is respecting a person qua promisee.
What does respecting the promisee's authority amount to? For Anwander, it requires the
promisor to deliberate in a certain way: She ought to make her action (or, rather, her non-
performance) dependent upon the promisee's consent (claim 3). As the promisor can do so
by asking the promisee for release from the promise, performing the promised action is not
necessary to do one's duty and to keep a promise.
Anwander further substantiates his account by considering several objections. However,
some questions remain unanswered. First, I wonder whether analysing promissory obligations
as normative requirements is compatible with claiming that the promissory obligation is an
obligation to perform the promised act: A normative requirement usually concerns a relation
between mental states (e.g. it is normatively required that [if you believe that p and believe
that p implies q, then you believe that q]). So if promissory obligations are normative
requirements, the relata will be mental states. According to Anwander, the normative
requirement in question is “It is normatively required that [If you promise to do X, then you
do X]”. It follows that both the antecedent and the consequent of this conditional have to be
mental entities. But while this might hold for the antecedent, it seems untenable for the
consequent: An action is not a mental entity. So if promissory obligations were normative
requirements, the consequent should better be a mental state (perhaps “..., then you intend to
do X”). But changing the consequent of the normative requirement means changing the
content of the promissory obligation: What is required— given that you promised to do X—
is that you intend to do X, but not that you perform X. So claim 2 is not quite right.
With regard to claim 4, another question arises from the fact that respect for legislative
authority is reciprocal: Just as the promisor ought to respect the promisee's autonomy, the
promisee ought to respect the promisor's autonomy. But if (a) promise-related moral duties
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result from respect for autonomy — i.e. respect for the exercise of a normative power (claim
4) — and if (b) respect for autonomy applies to all persons involved and if (c) promises are
joint commitments in which both parties exercise normative powers (claim 1), then respect for
legislative autonomy calls for a reciprocal set of duties: one that the promisor owes to the
promisee (the duty to keep promises) and one that the promisee owes to the promisor. But
there is no such duty. So the problem is to reconcile the symmetry of the respect principle with
the asymmetry of the duties which result from the principle.
These minor issues notwithstanding, the book has much to recommend for: Its
knowledgeable discussion of the philosophical literature is revealing and informative;
Anwander presents his arguments and many noteworthy distinctions in a remarkably clear
style; moreover, his own original proposal is highly inspiring and a substantial advancement
of the discussion. These features make the book a prime example of high-level practical
philosophy and a rewarding reading to moral philosophers and anyone interested in issues of
practical rationality, normativity, and the theory of action.
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